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INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, a few years after Yolanda Bejarano began selling fruit
in Puebla’s downtown streets, she met “El Botas,” a student at the state
university who was helping vendors organize. They began dating and fell
in love. The young couple had a baby, but soon after, El Botas disengaged
from his parental responsibilities. Bejarano became a single mother, selling
wares with her son by her side. To this day she keeps photographs of the
boy playing on top of the wooden cart she used to transport and display
her merchandise. When the police arrived and tried to prevent vendors
from selling in public spaces, Bejarano, like many peddlers, could quickly
pull the cart, loaded with fruit and her child, and flee. Tired of evading
the police and losing merchandise, she became a leading union organizer
among her fellow vendors. In the fall of 1973 Bejarano and approximately
four hundred others formed the Unión Popular de Vendedores Ambulantes (Popular Union of Street Vendors, upva). Unlike most Mexican
unions the upva was independent from the ruling Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, pri). During the union’s
height in the mid-1980s it had some ten thousand members, making the
upva the largest organization of its kind in Mexico’s province.1
Like their friend Bejarano, Adolfo Corona and his wife, Paula Javier,
were politically active vendors. In 1974 they participated in the upva’s
cultural commission, a group that used art to publicize vendors’ struggles. Corona and Javier wanted to demonstrate how local police officers
repressed vendors, so Corona performed the role of a police officer in a
1
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play the sellers entitled Street Vendors. They believed their play was an
effective political strategy to express the troubles peddlers met on a daily
basis. Ideologically the couple was inspired by their close connection to
young leftist students and by some of their own reading. For years Corona
and Javier received the Pekín Informa (Peking Review), the Maoist weekly
magazine published in China and circulated in Mexico in Spanish.2
Although Javier was illiterate, she enjoyed listening to her husband read
aloud. Corona liked the magazine because it was attuned to his own
political ideas and to poor people’s struggle for dignity.
The lives of these three individuals exemplify a slice of the complex economic and political conditions that thousands of street vendors in Puebla,
Mexico’s fourth-largest city, experienced during the last three decades of
the twentieth century. Street Democracy tells the story of ordinary men
and women—people like Bejarano, Corona, and Javier—who fought
against social, economic, and political oppression during the waning of
the Mexican Miracle and the rise of the neoliberal turn. From the 1940s
to the 1970s the country witnessed a sustained economic growth—the
Mexican Miracle—in which the gdp grew 6.2 percent annually.3 After the
1982 debt crisis, the political elite began implementing neoliberal reforms
in which the state significantly reduced its expenditure in key areas of the
economy, promoted market-oriented reforms, sold or closed state-owned
industries, and drastically modified government policies toward labor.4
By bringing together street vendors’ economic and political histories,
this book explains how vendors made a living during these turbulent years
and how they organized politically against the backdrop of increasing
state authoritarianism. Focusing on the upva offers an opportunity to
understand an independent union of actors in the informal economy
that has maintained a grassroots resistance to the pri state for over four
decades. In a city known for its political and social conservatism, vendors
found allies among left-wing students. This alliance helped vendors create
a militant and democratic union. Vendors borrowed from the student
movement several political strategies they put into practice to defend
their right to make a living in public spaces. Studying this regional case
also allows us to expand our understanding of left-wing militant and
2
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working-class students. These students did not take up arms and join
guerrillas, did not become proletarian in an effort to educate workers
in factories, and did not succumb to co-optation by the pri. Instead
they continued their activism among actors in the informal economy. In
short, a group of militant Poblano students took an alternative path of
resistance by helping vendors organize a pri-independent and militant
union. The vendor-student alliance also illustrates the role each played in
building the New Left in the city of Puebla, including their “transnational
dimension of social and cultural protest” and their “non-armed aspects
of radical challenges to political and social norms.”5
The union that vendors formed in 1973 allowed the illiterate, the urban
poor, and recent migrants to take part in the political life of their city
and country. For vendors democracy meant the right to make a living
in public spaces such as sidewalks, streets, and markets; the right to
organize independently from the pri and to publicly dissent from
authorities. Democracy also meant the right to elect their union leaders,
participate in daily union activities, learn skills, be elected to union
positions, and create alternative narratives. In short, organized vendors
exercised forms of direct democracy and challenged state authoritarianism and its control over Mexico’s unions.6 Street Democracy is the
first book to discuss the role of informal workers in a broader wave of
independent labor insurgency that reached its height in the 1970s and
continues to exist.7
As historians have demonstrated, beginning in the 1940s the pri
state faced great resistance from groups of rural and urban Mexicans of
diverse class backgrounds and numerous locations across the country.8
Puebla’s organized street vendors belong to this history of resistance
that demystifies the Pax Priísta, the belief that Mexico enjoyed political
stability thanks to the pri-led government. The upva case demonstrates
that the pri could not co-opt all unions or avoid cross-sectoral alliances.
But like many other Mexicans across the country, independently organized vendors also paid for their defiance. Agents of the state relied on
a combination of strategies, including negotiation, collaboration, and
Introduction 3
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most often illegal procedures and violence, to try to end dissent; local,
state, and federal officials also carried out these tactics against vendors
and their leaders. 9
Through their independent union vendors ultimately were able to sell
their wares on prime downtown streets and make a living for thirteen
years, from 1973 to 1986. After 1986, when the local government forced
them to relocate, vendors secured stalls at newly built municipal markets. Securing these spots on the streets and at markets allowed them to
work and make a living during the most acute economic crises of late
twentieth-century Mexico—no minor victory.
Official and Independent Unions
In order to control organized labor and to build a base of support among
the working class, the ruling party co-opted, or at least tried to co-opt
most unions into its ranks. The co-optation of unions and the often
artificial base of support that the regime created was part of the corporatist structure of the ruling party.10 Strong efforts to consolidate this
corporatism happened during the administration of President Lázaro
Cárdenas (1934–40). In 1938 Cárdenas transformed the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party) into the Partido
de la Revolución Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution)—the
predecessors of the pri—and reorganized it to incorporate unions of
peasants, industrial workers, and the military into the party’s sectors.
These sectors were mainly represented by large confederations: the Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation), the
Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican
Workers, ctm), and, after its creation in 1943, the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (National Confederation of Popular
Organizations), which also included the organizations of the so-called
popular classes and the middle class. The military’s official participation
in its own confederation was relatively brief, from 1938 to 1941.11
The street vendors’ unions were among those that the state incorporated into the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares,
a confederation that included a motley crew of teachers, public-sector
4
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employees, intellectuals, women’s associations, lawyers, manufacturers,
small and medium-size businesses, industrialists and landowners, as well
as those the state did not recognize as workers and those who did not
identify as such.12 It also included individual military men who became
involved in official politics after President Manuel Ávila Camacho dissolved the military sector in 1941.13 Once incorporated into the pri—the
name of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana since 1946—the party
rewarded union loyalty with political and economic benefits for union
leaders and some benefits for the membership.14 In the case of vendors’
unions, the party traded their votes and support to pri politicians for
temporary spaces in commercially attractive locations and offered some
political posts for vendors’ leaders.15 The co-opted vendors’ unions became,
at least in theory, one of the pillars of the party’s corporatist structure.
The unions that the ruling party incorporated and co-opted became
the official unions.16 After 1948 they were also known as charro unions
because the party often selected leaders called charros (cowboys).17 For
the most part, charros placated the rank-and-file and guaranteed the
unions’ loyalty to the pri, to state policies, and to employers.18 Among
other requirements, affiliation to the party meant that union members
had to vote for official candidates at the local, state, and federal levels.
In theory, by inserting these groups into the party’s ranks and allegedly
neutralizing them, the pri helped facilitate Mexico’s economic growth
by allowing employers to keep wages low and subdue potential strikes.
Not all workers allowed the party machine to control the political
life of their organizations. Workers in a variety of industries and in the
countryside sought to democratize their charro unions from within or
formed independent unions that refused to be incorporated into the
pri.19 By doing so they challenged the party corporatist structure. Generally speaking, independent unions had democratic characteristics and
were committed to fight for the interests of their members.20 Members
usually had the freedom and the mechanisms to elect their own leaders,
who were known individuals within the group. To avoid a monopoly of
power by one or more individuals, leaders were not supposed to hold
positions for extended periods of time. Instead elections happened on a
Introduction 5
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regular basis. The independent leadership did not force their members
to vote for the pri and tended to be more militant. At least in theory,
members of the independent unions actively and voluntarily participated in their organizations. They attended meetings and carried out
protests and strikes. Rank-and-file members also had a say in the union’s
decision-making process. This participation allowed people to have a
more thorough knowledge of their unions. In contrast, workers in official
and “white unions”—the equivalent of “company unions” in the United
States—sometimes did not even know to which union they belonged,
what the purpose of the union was, or even who their leaders were.21
Union independence in Mexico has a long and rich history that,
although not always completely successful, goes back to the revolutionary
period. Since the 1920s the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana
(Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers, crom) had a near monopoly on organized labor. The first attempts to organize autonomously
occurred when unions sought to disengage from the crom during the
1920s and 1930s. In 1921 some unions, influenced by anarchosyndicalist
groups, joined the Confederación General de Trabajadores (General Confederation of Workers), which was committed to maintaining its autonomy
from the crom and from President Álvaro Obregón’s presidency.22
In 1933 different labor and peasant unions formed the Confederación
General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (General Confederation
of Workers and Peasants of Mexico, cgocm), which promoted state
independence and union democracy. Three years later a broad range of
organizations—including the cgocm—merged to become the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, which, during its early years, tried to
form broad coalitions of industrial and agricultural laborers. Many unions
in the ctm became disillusioned when President Cárdenas incorporated
the ctm into the ruling party in 1938.23 In Puebla, for instance, after the
1940 presidential elections the Federación Regional de Obreros y Campesinos (Regional Federation of Workers and Peasants, froc) severed
its ties with the ctm, remaining “one of the more militant mainstream
labor federations into the mid-1940s.”24 At the national level large industrial unions in the railroad, oil, and mining and metalworker industries
6
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left the ctm and supported the leftist Popular Party in 1948. As a result
the state countered union dissidence by replacing militant leaders with
charros.25 Workers, however, continued fighting, so even if charro leaders
dominated organized labor for decades, they faced much rank-and-file
resistance. Some charros, however, secured benefits for workers; as a result
these workers viewed the charros as legitimate leaders.26
Yet in the mid-1960s and especially in the early 1970s Mexico’s organized labor witnessed the increasing and rapid emergence of a wave of
independent unionism that scholars have identified as the “new labor
insurgency,” whose novelty stemmed from the unions’ rupture with the
pri.27 More important, at its core the “labor insurgency was mainly a
democratizing movement.”28 By the end of the 1970s workers in different industries had created approximately one hundred independent
unions.29 These included unions in the auto, food processing, and garment
industries, as well as among university faculty and staff.30 Some of these
independent unions joined umbrella organizations such as the Frente
Auténtico del Trabajo (Authentic Labor Front), the Unidad Obrera
Independiente (Independent Workers Union), and the Central Campesina Independiente (Independent Peasant Organization).31
The new labor insurgency was fueled by President Luis Echeverría’s
democratic opening (1970–76), in which he tried, for political reasons,
to distance his administration from the ctm.32 But the rise of independent unions did not necessarily emerge from top-down policies, as
some scholars have suggested.33 While Echeverría’s democratic opening
facilitated the conditions for independent unions to multiply, it cannot
fully explain why workers chose these kinds of organizations. As Michael
Snodgrass has noted, changes in industrial relations resulted in new production methods that negatively affected workers. In turn, they resisted
their bosses by organizing independent unions or by working to form
democratic currents within official unions.34
Street Democracy demonstrates that militant and democratic unions
originated not only on shop floors and in the fields but also on the
streets. The upva’s case shows that the labor insurgency of the 1970s
emerged from the bottom up and included members of the informal
Introduction 7
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sector. Street vendors did not have employers who pressured them to
increase production while keeping wages low. Their independent unionism
developed out of a new sociopolitical context on the streets of Puebla.
The harsh conditions that vendors experienced and the support of militant left-wing students at Puebla’s Autonomous State University fueled
the organization of the upva. The emergence of the vendors’ union
also occurred as Puebla’s political elite, the avilacamachistas, faced a
rupture with the federal government.35 By the early 1970s the political
context in the streets of Puebla was ripe for vendors to organize an
independent union.
Challenges to the State
Independent unions presented several challenges to the state, to official
union leaders, and to employers. By striking and demanding higher wages
and better working and housing conditions, independent unions posed an
economic threat to the state. Since upva members did not have employers
and could not strike, their main challenge occurred in the political sphere.
Vendors used public spaces to march, protest, perform theater, read, and
discuss ideas, offering alternatives to more traditional forms of political
action. For instance, when vendors took to the streets to protest, they
were making themselves visible and were publicly drawing attention to
their problems.36 This represented a challenge for the pri state, which
claimed to support the interests of ordinary people.
Vendors also publicly protested the clientelistic structure of the state.
In the past, as the political sociologist Leonardo Avritzer points out,
“material improvements for ordinary citizens represent[ed] favors to
be delivered by elite political mediators.”37 Indeed from the moment
vendors formed unions, members relied on the will of official leaders to
achieve their demands. In the case of the upva, its independence allowed
vendors to negotiate directly with authorities. They did so by organizing in political commissions, marching on the most important avenues,
occupying the streets surrounding the municipal palace, and entering in
direct dialogue with municipal and state authorities. Vendors did not
need official union leaders to achieve their goals in exchange for their
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political support of the ruling party. In this way vendors’ use of public
space forced authorities to engage in a political dialogue with them.
Since the upva did not make their members vote for ruling party
politicians, the pri faced the possibility that organized vendors might support oppositional parties such as the Partido Acción Nacional (National
Action Party, pan) or, later, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática
(Party of the Democratic Revolution). The pri also lost its ability to use
independent union members as acarreados, people dragged to rallies,
auditoriums, and stadiums during campaigns to give the impression that
pri politicians enjoyed broad popular support.38 Last, the party could not
use independent unionists, like upva vendors, to attack political enemies.
For instance, when a pan mayor won Puebla city’s elections in 1996, the
pri governor at the time sent pri-affiliated street vendors to set up their
stalls in downtown streets to create an image of disorder that the pan
mayor was allegedly unable to resolve.39 In this situation official union
members acted as pawns of the state governor; upva members did not.
Moreover Puebla’s independently organized vendors created alliances
with different groups in society, an act that defied one of the supposed
tenets of corporatism: maintaining the different sectors of the pri within
the party but apart from each other.40 Thus the pri tried to avoid crosssectoral alliances. But as historians have demonstrated, workers, peasants,
students, and middle-class groups formed alliances with one another that
showed the limitations of the party.41 By not affiliating with the pri, the
upva was also free to create cross-sectoral alliances. These relationships
led to the creation of fronts, which had the potential of promoting political change in Mexico. Over the decades vendors joined some of these
organizations. In the early 1970s, for instance, they participated in the
Frente de Activistas Emiliano Zapata (Emiliano Zapata Activists Front)
with students and in the Frente de Autodefensa del Pueblo (People’s SelfDefense Front), which included tenants, peasants, vendors, and students.42
Losses
Choosing union independence was a bold move for street vendors in
the authoritarian regime of the Mexican state. Independence resulted in
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several political and material losses to the unions. Not surprisingly the
ruling party gave more material and political concessions and rewards
to official unions than to independent organizations. For instance, independent unions did not receive money or subsidies from the state for
daily operations.43 Under these circumstances the upva leadership had
to rely exclusively on member fees for all expenses. A more dangerous
consequence for independent leaders and members was their vulnerability
to repression by local, state, and federal authorities. Therefore a second
theme of Street Democracy is state repression. Although the state’s tolerance
of independent unions was an important characteristic of President Echeverría’s democratic opening, if these organizations became too militant
the state crushed them with the same violence that had characterized
previous administrations. In fact all forms of state violence became a
large component of the street vendor experience. Even before vendors
organized their union in the fall of 1973, police beat vendors, seizing their
merchandise and destroying their stalls, and detaining them for hours or
even days. Worse still, police sometimes jailed men and women together
with their young children.
Once vendors organized the upva, they went from being a local
problem to a concern of the state and federal governments. It was then
that local, state, and federal authorities struck back. The federals spied
on the organization, while local and state governments employed legal
and illegal mechanisms to incarcerate their leaders, torturing some of
them in order to neutralize the power of the union. In Puebla the state
used violence alongside the rhetoric of historical heritage preservation,
which provided an effective strategy to mask its authoritarianism during
the neoliberal turn. Referring to neoliberal cities around the world, the
urban geographer David Harvey correctly asserts that “violence is required
to build the new urban world on the wreckage of the old.”44 This book
shows that such violence and intimidation have not ceased.
Neoliberalism
By the mid-1980s, as Mexico entered its neoliberal phase, the state used
new strategies, in addition to physical violence, to destroy activists and
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their independent or militant organizations, while at the same time trying
not to appear authoritarian. A third theme in Street Democracy is Mexico’s engagement with neoliberal policies, specifically the redefinition
of the use of public space and the fierce fight against unions. The state
presented itself as a defender of urban order and capitalist modernization
and violently punished those who, like street vendors, appeared to disrupt
it. As a supporter of modernization the state selectively encouraged the
efforts of some social groups to move forward economically. Following
a centuries-long tradition, local and state authorities regulated what they
considered the appropriate use of public space and, with the neoliberal
turn, fully privileged the projects of the upper and middle classes over
those of the urban poor and the working class. I trace the transformation
of public space from a relatively community-oriented and working-class
space to a neoliberal space where large capital dominated. With the aid
of business leaders, local and state governments devised a more effective
strategy that could finally solve the problem of street vending—and
eliminate the upva in the process—all while authorities appeared to
defend and protect Puebla’s historical heritage. In the mid-1980s several
state agencies petitioned the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (unesco) to include Puebla’s downtown
on the World Heritage Site list.45 As part of this petition, these groups
committed to “rescue” and “dignify” the downtown area before and after
Puebla’s inclusion.46
In 1986 municipal authorities supported by business groups began to
remove street vendors from the so-called historic downtown to the new
markets in the outskirts of the city. In connivance with state authorities,
economic elites closed La Victoria market and, years later, transformed
it into a shopping mall that housed, among others, two Walmart-owned
retailers. Once more Harvey is correct: “The right to the city, as it is now
constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a small
political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more
and more after their own desires.”47 In this context it is not surprising
that vendors of fruits and knickknacks like Bejarano, Javier, and Corona
practically disappeared from the streets at the heart of the neoliberal city.
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